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MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Jud Mathews*
A persistent challenge for the American administrative state is reconciling the vast
powers of unelected agencies with our commitment to government by the people. Many
features of contemporary administrative law—from the right to participate in agency
processes, to the reason-giving requirements on agencies, to the presidential review of
rulemaking—have been justified, at least in part, as means to square the realities of
agency power with our democratic commitments. At the root of any such effort there lies
a theory of democracy, whether fully articulated or only implicit: some conception of
what democracy is about, and what democracy requires.
While several conceptions of democracy have influenced administrative law over the
years, administrative law has never come to terms with a strand of democratic thought
that I term democratic minimalism. Democratic minimalists argue that conventional
theories of democracy set unrealistic benchmarks to evaluate government practices,
because they expect more than is reasonable of citizens, leaders, and institutions.
Accordingly, minimalists seek to offer a less ambitious, more attainable account of
democratic governance that nonetheless captures core normative commitments.
This Article presents the first account of minimally democratic administrative law. The
Article identifies the conceptions of democracy that have dominated thinking about
administrative law to this point and highlights challenges to them before outlining a
competing, minimalist conception of democracy. It then revisits contemporary debates
over how courts should review agency action from a minimalist standpoint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The administrative state seems to have a democracy problem. On the
conventional telling, the exercise of public power in a democracy is
legitimate only to the extent that it can be traced back to “the people,”
who are ultimately sovereign. In a representative democracy, elections
link officeholders to the public, and thereby legitimate their use of the
coercive powers of state. It is more complicated to give an account of
why unelected agency officials may legitimately exercise public power in
a democracy, precisely because the electoral connection is missing. The
more that agencies are making substantive policy choices with the force
of law (as opposed to merely carrying out policies chosen by the
legislature), the more acute the democratic problem appears. And the
volume of substantive policy choices made by modern agencies in the
United States is simply staggering.1
Not surprisingly, concern over the democratic legitimacy of
administrative power, together with related concerns over its
constitutionality, have been abiding preoccupations for scholars,
officials, and reformers. In 1937, President Roosevelt’s Committee on
Administrative Management darkly warned of the power reposed in the
“headless fourth branch of government.”2 Forty years later, James
Freedman noted the “recurrent sense of crisis” that has afflicted
administrative law for more than a century, with many of the concerns
relating to the democratic bona fides of administrative action.3
The notion that administrative power threatens democratic governance
persists. Writing for the Court a few terms ago, Chief Justice Roberts
opined that “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields
vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the
1

As one measure, the Fall 2015 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions lists 2,244 active rulemakings, of which 149 are
“economically significant,” meaning that they have an impact of $100 million
or more on the economy. Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 80 Fed. Reg. 77709 (Dec. 15, 2015). Data
from the Unified Agenda is available at Reginfo, www.reginfo.gov (last visited
Jan. 28, 2016).
2
PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL
STUDIES 37 (1937).
3
JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6 (1978).
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concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that
of the people.”4 Still more recently, Columbia Professor Philip
Hamburger argued in his 2014 book Is Administrative Power Unlawful?
that “administrative law is the contemporary expression of the tendency
toward absolute power—toward consolidated power outside and above
the law.”5
Crucially, democratic concerns about administrative power are not
purely academic. To the contrary, they have inspired significant changes
to the administrative process and administrative law doctrine over the
past half century. Judges, scholars, and policymakers have participated
in major efforts to rethink and restructure how administrative power is
exercised. An aim of most of these efforts has been to make the
administrative state function in a matter more compatible with our
democratic commitments.
This is true of the judicial innovations that opened the informal
rulemaking process and judicial review to wider sets of stakeholders in
the 1960s and 1970s.6 These developments expanded opportunities for
“the people” to participate in self-government—not by voting, but by
articulating their views in the agency policymaking process (or, if need
be, in court). It is also true of the jurisprudence, dating from the same
period, that demanded exhaustively reasoned decision making from
agencies.7 A robust justification from the agency offers assurance that
4

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561
U. S. 477, 499 (2010).
5
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 16 (2014).
Spoiler alert: his answer is yes. For a different perspective, see Adrian
Vermeule, No. Review of Is Administrative Law Unlawful? by Philip
Hamburger, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015). Justice Thomas cited Hamburger’s
book numerous times in his concurrence in Department of Transportation v.
Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1242-44 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
6
See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(broadening the test for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act and
thereby permitting a broader set of claimants to challenge agency action in
court); Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (setting aside the grant of a television license for failure to
allow a public interest group intervene).
7
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(applying “hard look” review to the rescission of a rule by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration); United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (setting aside an agency decision for
failure to respond adequately to an argument made by a regulated party during
the notice and comment process).
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its decision was the product of careful and comprehensive deliberation
about what policy choices best serve the common good. Likewise,
moves to strengthen the President’s role in administration, both
through judicial doctrines and also through structural changes to the
administrative process, have also been justified with reference to
democratic values. If the President serves as the people’s tribune in
government, amplifying her ability to use executive branch agencies to
pursue her agenda is pro-democratic.
All of these concerns, and the reforms they have inspired, rest on
conceptions of democracy, whether implicit or explicit. In other words,
at the root of each lies some idea of what democracy is, and what
democracy requires. A conception of democracy involves both
normative and positive elements: it expresses a political ideal, grounded
in an understanding of how institutions of government can actually
work. For instance: Some people may believe that democracy is
fundamentally a matter of aggregating the preferences of individuals
into policies that reflect the wishes of the majority. Others, that
democracy is at heart about pursuing a shared vision of the common
good, which is forged through collective deliberation. It matters how
we think about democracy, because different theories of democracy
underwrite different ideas about how the institutions of government
should function. Indeed, some practices that are democracy-enhancing
on one theory of democracy may actually have anti-democratic
consequences on a different understanding of how democracy works.
A pluralist conception of democracy, which emphasizes competition
among interest groups as the engine of public policy making, shaped the
design of the administrative process and the development of
administrative law in the decades following World War II. A number
of administrative law practices also resonate with civic republican
theory, which emphasizes how constructive engagement and dialogue
can generate public-regarding consensus on policy matters. More recent
moves towards presidential control implicitly appeal to a plebiscitary
model of democracy, in which the President’s actions enjoy a privileged
legitimacy because the President is elected by the people as a whole. But
administrative law has never had an open and sustained engagement

MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

5

with a strand of political theory that I call democratic minimalism.8 I
argue that it is time to do so.
Democratic minimalism is not a single theory so much as an orientation
towards thinking about democracy. Minimalist theories are united by
an interest in reducing the gap between theorizing and democratic
practice. Minimalist theories of democracy are “minimalist” in that they
set a lower bar for what it means to be democratic than most traditional
theories. Minimalists characteristically argue that conventional theories
of democracy are unrealistic as benchmarks to evaluate government
practices, because they expect more than is reasonable of citizens,
leaders, and institutions. Accordingly, minimalists seek to offer a less
ambitious and more attainable account of democracy that nonetheless
captures core democratic commitments. While minimalism has a
historical pedigree, this way of thinking about democracy has received
renewed attention from political theorists in recent years.9
One reason to engage with democratic minimalism is that there are
reasons to suspect that the conceptions of democracy that have long
dominated administrative law thinking may be poor guides to
structuring our administrative practices. Pluralist and civic republican
models of democracy have come in for forceful critiques that the
standards they set for the institutions of government are unobtainable.
What is more, courts’ valiant but doomed efforts to hold the
administrative process to these standards can lead to outcomes that are
undesirable by anyone’s lights. On the other hand, presidentialists may
go too far the other direction, if they take the view that democracy
requires nothing more than empowering an elected executive. Crucially,
minimalists address the shortcomings of traditional theory not by
abandoning democratic goals altogether, but instead by adjusting
expectations for what government can achieve. If it does not make sense
8

See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in
DEMOCRACY’S VALUES 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds.,
1999). Some scholars use the phrase “minimalist conception of democracy” to
denote purely procedural accounts of democracy. Procedural theories of
democracy hold that any political outcomes reached through fair procedures
are ipso facto democratically legitimate. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER,
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 11-12
(2007). As I use the term, democratic minimalism does not exclude theories
that impose substantive criteria for democracy (such as the principle of nondomination, discussed further below).
9
See infra note 132.
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to measure democratic success by the lights of traditional theory, then
we require different and more realistic benchmarks for democratic
success, and minimalist theories aim to provide them.10
This Article is the first to outline a conception of minimally democratic
administrative law—that is, to assess the administrative process against
a minimalist conception of democracy. This vantage point of
minimalism offers a fresh perspective on a set of long-running and
important debates within administrative law. This Article focuses on
one of the central scholarly preoccupations of administrative law—
judicial review—and evaluates existing practices from a minimalist
perspective. What emerges is a new account of the role judicial review
should play in administrative law that at the same time resonates with
some influential contemporary arguments.
In the minimalist conception of democracy outlined below, the core
task of a court reviewing agency action is to protect against domination:
the abusive or arbitrary interference with persons’ basic interests.
Reorienting judicial review towards this end requires a redistribution of
judicial scrutiny. Most of the time, courts should engage only in a lowintensity, “reasonableness” review. More judicial scrutiny is triggered by
circumstances that suggest a high risk of domination: in particular,
outcomes so seriously disadvantageous to affected parties that it appears
the agency may have disregarded their interests entirely. Under these
circumstances, the agency will face a higher burden of justification.
The minimalist conception offers new perspectives on other aspects of
judicial review, including the reason-giving requirement that is a
cornerstone of contemporary administrative law. Civic republicans
could argue that setting very high standards for deliberation and
10

Democratic minimalism is not to be confused with other “minimalisms” that
have received attention from legal scholars in recent years, notably judicial
minimalism and Burkean minimalism, which is a traditionalist variant of
judicial minimalism. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999); Cass
R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006). What these
approaches arguably do share with democratic minimalism is a “less is more”
ethos, which counsels that asking too much of institutions often leads them
into error. The approach outlined here is also not to be confused with what is
sometimes called “minimal rationality review” in administrative law, which
amounts to rational basis review. See Ernest M. Jones, A Component Approach
to Minimal Rationality Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 275
(1987).
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justification is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of agency policy
choices. And as judicial review is currently practiced, as a practical
matter agencies must be prepared to show that they carefully considered
every alternative, and that the choice they made was superior to the
alternatives. From a minimalist perspective, there is ordinarily no need
for the justificatory burden on agencies to be so demanding, with the
result that agencies can offer a wider class of reasons to justify their
actions. Also, contemporary judicial review doctrine makes agency
inaction almost unreviewable. Recognizing that agency neglect can also
amount to domination, minimalism favors more symmetrical treatment
of agency action and inaction. 11
Democratic minimalism aligns with, and provides some theoretical
ballast for, certain ideas that enjoy some currency in contemporary
administrative law. Commentators have long observed the gap between
what administrative law promises and what it delivers when it comes to
measures aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of administrative
outcomes. In particular, some scholars have argued that imposing
additional justification requirements on agency decision makers can
ossify the rulemaking process, with welfare-reducing results,12 and have
advanced proposals to “de-ossify” the process, including by making
judicial review less demanding.13 Furthermore, some have argued that,
in practice, courts do conduct judicial review at least loosely along the

11

For more detail on all of these arguments, see infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of
Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the
1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991).
13
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Eight
Things Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 5 (2009). For a skeptical reaction, see Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review
or Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). Works in this
vein share the sense that imposing exacting requirements on agencies can
make the perfect (i.e., the highest standards of participation or justification)
into the enemy of the good (i.e., timely, effective regulatory responses to real
problems). Sidney Shapiro taps into this idea when he advocates what he calls
pragmatic administrative law. Shapiro rejects any sort of grand theory as a
benchmark for administrative practices, and counsels instead “to measure the
worthiness of an idea by its operation in actual experience, rather than by its
consistency with the precepts of one particular theory or another.” Sidney A.
Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, Issues in Legal Scholarship (2005).
12
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lines of the proposal developed here, varying the intensity of review
depending on what is at stake.14
Democratic minimalism complements these lines of scholarship and onthe-ground developments in important ways. Administrative law does
not lack for concrete proposals to streamline, improve, and otherwise
reform the administrative process.15 But these proposals tend not to
engage, at least in much depth, with debates over what makes the
exercise of administrative power legitimate in a democracy. This Article
offers an organizing frame for assessments of contemporary
administrative practice, linking them to these broader theoretical
concerns. In this way, this Article helps bring together two ongoing,
largely separate conservations: one about administrative reform, and the
other about political theory.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II characterizes the main
strands of democratic thought that have influenced administrative law
thinkers and highlights how these perspectives have influenced changes
to administrative practice over the past half century. Part III then
outlines the minimalist challenge to these ways of thinking about
democracy, and describes an alternative democratic ideal, rooted in the
concept of non-domination. Part IV assesses a number of features of
judicial review from the perspective of democratic minimalism. Part V
discusses some objections, and concludes.
II. DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This Part aims to identify the strands of democratic theory that have
been most influential within administrative law over the past half
century, to highlight the features of contemporary administrative law
that correspond to these different ways of thinking about democracy,
and to identify the principle critiques directed at each. I focus on three
14

Lisa Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
(Michael Herz, Richard W. Murphy, & Kathryn A. Watts eds., 2015) (“In
practice, the grounds for setting aside an agency action under the arbitraryand-capricious test vary according to the nature and magnitude of that action.
Thus, a court typically will apply the criteria set forth in this chapter rigorously
during judicial review of high-stakes rulemaking proceedings . . . , but much
more leniently when reviewing for example, an adjudicative matter that an
agency would be expected to dispose of quickly.”).
15
See supra note 13.
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broad families of democratic theory, which I describe as (1) pluralist, (2)
civic republican, and (3) presidentialist.
It is simply not possible, in the context of this Article, to do justice to
the sophistication and diversity of American democratic thought over
several decades. My account necessarily relies on simplifications, not
least in the way I wrangle the wide-ranging works of diverse thinkers
into three discrete categories.16 But for present purposes, these labels
suffice to illustrate the main lines of influence democratic theory has
had on administrative law.
A. Pluralism
1. Pluralist Theory
Pluralism was the dominant theory of democracy in midcentury
America, though it had had its first season of influence in the late 1920s
and early 1930s.17 In fact, it may understate the influence of pluralism to
refer to it as a political theory at all. At a time before political theory
emerged as a niche subfield separate from the broader currents of
political science, pluralism was more a set of operating assumptions
common to most American political scientists who studied American
government (which at the time was most American political scientists).18
To understand pluralism, it helps to know what it was an argument
against. For the second half of the nineteenth century, most efforts to
16

In particular, deliberative democracy theorists might bristle at being forced
to share the civic republican label. While theorists of deliberative democracy
would be correct to insist that they deserve an entry of their own in an
encyclopedia of political theory, see, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL
THEORY (Mark Bevir ed., 2010) (offering separate entries for deliberative
democracy and civic republicanism), the similarities of their prescriptions for
the administrative process warrant their treatment as a unit here. See Section
II.B below.
17
JOHN G. GUNNELL, IMAGINING THE AMERICAN POLITY: POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND THE DISCOURSE OF DEMOCRACY 22 (2004). Arthur Bentley
introduced the pluralist conception of politics to American political science in
his book The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures, but his ideas only
became widely influential later. For a readable description of Bentley’s book
and its influence, see Nicholas Lemann, Conflict of Interest, THE NEW YORKER
86-92 (Aug. 11, 2008). Not every prominent political science was a pluralist;
E.E. Schattschneider is one notable exception. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1960).
18
Id. at 4.
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understand American government had been in thrall to the idea of “the
state,” conceived not just as a set of institutions, but as an organic
“sovereign society” that preexisted government.19 Among other things,
this way of thinking about government has a sharply unitarian character,
in that it presupposes an already existing, unitary state that finds
expression in government.20
Pluralists disagreed. The American people were an irreducibly diverse
bunch, with an array of opposing interests, and efforts to bridge
divisions in the service of a supervening common good were destined to
fail. Americans simply did not come together as one when it came to
matters of policy. Americans did, however, come together as many: they
formed a multitude of groups with shared interests, or in the coinage
popularized by David Truman, “interest groups.”21 Each of these groups
pressed government to deliver public policies that favored its own
interests. From a pluralist perspective, politics are fundamentally
interest group politics, and the foremost task of government is to
mediate among these competing interest group demands in forming
policy.22
The pluralist vision of government—of interest group politics—is an
unromantic one. Even so, most mid-century pluralists were optimistic
about the capacity of democratic government to produce good
outcomes. With government subject to pressure from all sides, no one
interest group could consistently call the shots. So long as numerous
channels for applying pressure to government actors were open to all
19

JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE
GENEALOGY OF AN AMERICAN VOCATION 29 (1993).
20
The idea of the unitary state with an autonomous existence of its own was a
persistent one, even as scholars sought to take a “scientific” approach to
understanding government. A sentence from Columbia Professor Frank
Goodnow’s presidential address at the first meeting of the American Political
Science Association in 1905 vividly illustrates the point. Goodnow declared
that the object of political scientists should be to consider “[t]he State, as an
object of scientific study, . . . from the point of view of the various operations
necessary to the realization of the State will.” FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE
WORK OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 37 (1905).
21
DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 33 (1ST ED. 1951).
22
Arthur Bentley introduced the pluralist conception of politics to American
political science in a 1908 book, but the ideas only reached their apogee of
influence after the Second World War. ARTHUR BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908).
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comers, the competition to shape policy was a fair fight. And many
pluralists noted favorably the numerous access points in American
government, including legislative lobbying, bureaucratic engagement,
and public opinion campaigns. And as Robert Dahl emphasized,
updating Madison’s argument from the Federalist #10, while one
interest group might hold the upper hand on one issue, no class or group
in the United States was likely to dominate across the board.23
2. In Administrative Law
The 1960s and 1970s were times of major change for the administrative
process and administrative law. Many of these changes were introduced,
at least in part, in an effort to bring administrative practices into better
alignment with the nation’s democratic commitments. And the
conception of democracy that many of the legislators, judges,
administrators and scholars behind these efforts subscribed to, whether
implicitly or explicitly, was a pluralist one.
Administrative power is not problematic, from a democratic
perspective, when agencies merely carry out instructions handed down
from the people’s representatives in Congress—when they act as the
“transmission belt” for legislative directives, as a popular Machine Age
metaphor put it. This was the standard account into the early part of
the twentieth century, when—for the most part—agencies operated
with limited policy discretion.24 Administration could be conceived as a
technical field, wholly separate from politics.25 But by midcentury, no
one could seriously maintain this view. Newer agencies were outfitted
with wide-ranging discretionary powers to set policy over diverse
23

ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRACY THEORY (1956); see also
ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (1961). As John Gunnell notes, although Dahl “took pains to
distance himself from Madison’s account [in A Preface to Democratic Theory], he
developed a thesis that, in general terms, was nearly indistinguishable.”
GUNNELL, supra note 17, at 232.
24
For a recent revisionist view, emphasizing the substantial powers of agencies
prior to the twentieth century, see Jerry L. Mashaw, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
25
Woodrow Wilson took this view in an influential essay published in the late
1880s, and several years later, Frank Goodnow published a book with the same
starting premise. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION (1900); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2
POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
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subjects. The question became, what made it legitimate for them to do
so in a democracy?
Pluralists had a ready answer. Policymaking by agencies can be
democratic so long as interest groups have access to agencies, so that
they can make their cases there. And at first, many pluralists believed
that they would. So for instance, Kenneth Culp Davis in the late 1950s
could dismiss concerns that the administrative process was biased
towards certain policy outcomes, precisely because agencies were
susceptible to influence from all quarters, including both interest groups
and the other branches of government.26 Davis downplayed concerns
over agency capture, arguing that regulatory regimes generally aim to
balance public and private interests, and generally succeed in doing so.27
Writing of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Davis argues
that “a finding that the ICC strikes some sort of workable balance
among all of the conflicting interests affected is far from a finding of
failure of the regulatory process, whatever the deficiencies of the
ICC.”28
This view of the administrative process also has implications for how
courts should exercise their power of review over agencies: sparingly. If
agencies are permeable to interest groups already, courts have no
business undoing the deals struck among stakeholders. And so,
consistent with this view, Davis counseled courts to sit on their hands
when possible, arguing against judicial creation of new grounds for
review, and advocating internal agency review instead.29
Over time, though, it became harder and harder to maintain that kind
of sunny optimism in the face of the persistent and conspicuous
underperformance of agency government. By the beginning of the
26

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 14-23 (1958)
(discussed in Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity:
Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-70, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1389, 1408-09 (2000)).
27
See Davis, supra note 26, at 19.
28
Id. at 20.
29
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 112 (1958) (“A
limited judicial review does not weaken the administrative process but
strengthens it.”) As Reuel Schiller describes, Davis’ rosy view of agencies’
capacity to self-regulate did not survive into the 1960s, and in later works, he
advocated more aggressive judicial review to keep agencies in line. See Schiller,
supra note 26, at 1415.
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1960s, evidence was mounting that administrative process, left to its
own devices, did not reliably incorporate the interests of relevant
stakeholders to produce fair and even-handed policies.30 The mid-1950s
to early 1960s saw the appearance of a number of influential
postmortems dissecting agency failures.31 Most of these critical views
arrived at a similar diagnosis of where the pluralist account broke down:
agencies systematically favored the interests of the powerful or wellconnected over others. Instead of being open to all comers, the access
points to agency influence might be closed off—an “iron triangle,”
Theodore Lowi would later call it, linking favored interest groups,
congressional subcommittees, and agencies, to the exclusion of others.32
An imbalance of access helped to explain the curious problem of agency
capture: agencies ended up serving precisely the interests of those
parties they were supposed to be regulating.33
If the administrative process, left to its own devices, produces bad
outcomes, it is not necessarily appropriate for reviewing courts to sit on
their hands. And indeed, starting in the 1960s, broad changes emerged
in how judges approached judicial review over agencies. Reuel Schiller
has characterized these changes as reflecting a rejection of interest
group pluralism.34 I argue, to the contrary, that they show courts
doubling down on a pluralist conception of democracy. Courts
recognize agencies’ failure to even-handedly aggregate interest group
preferences into policy, but they do not reject the pluralist premise that
policies are properly forged out of the play of contending interest
groups. I argue that many of the changes to judicial review in the 1960s
and 1970s are best understood as efforts by courts to make the
30

See Schiller, supra note 26, at 1413.
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION (1955); Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); JAMES
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administrative process more genuinely pluralist, by opening it up more
fully to competing interests.
A raft of judge-initiated changes to administrative law in the 1960s and
1970s aimed to open the processes up more fully to those interests with
a stake in the matter.35 Richard Stewart chronicled these changes in his
magisterial 1975 article The Reformation of Administrative Law.36 Courts
broadened access to administration in a number of ways. First, they
expanded opportunities to intervene in on-the-record adjudications, the
trial-type proceedings that were the prototypical form of agency action
until the 1970s. Notably, in Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC,37 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the
grant of a television license because the agency had failed to permit a
church with an interest in civil rights intervene in the licensing
proceeding. According to the Court, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) simply could not vindicate the public interest on its
own: “experience demonstrates consumers are generally among the best
vindicators of the public interest.” The “congressional mandate of
public participation” is realized not through “writing letters to the
Commission” or the like, but through intervention: that is, participation
in the licensing process on terms comparable to the license applicant.
In other words, the Court was supervising the administrative process to
bring it more in line with the interest group pluralist conception.
A series of judicial decisions also expanded public access to the judicial
review of agency decisions, by lowering justiciability hurdles to the
review of administrative action. Perhaps most notably, courts
liberalized the legal standards for standing. In Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the Supreme Court rejected
the old “legal interest” test for standing to challenge agency action,
opening the court doors to any party “arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.”38 How do we know whether a party finds within
the zone of interests? Justice Douglas’s answer is framed in the language
of interest group pluralism. Even if statutes “do not in terms protect a
35
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specified group,” it is easy to identify “those whose interests are directly
affected” by litigation under those statutes.39 Other decisions in the
same period liberalized ripeness standards, bringing courts into
administrative controversies earlier.40 Cheering from the sidelines,
many scholars encouraged these efforts, recasting litigation as an
important form of public participation in agency decision making.41
Perhaps the most consequential change to the administrative process in
the 1960s and (especially) 1970s was the expanded use of notice-andcomment rulemaking, whether as a matter of agency choice or
congressional mandate.42 And the broader employment of notice-andcomment procedures was justified, in part, as a way to expand
participation in administrative decision making. If agency adjudication
resembles a judicial proceeding, rulemaking is typically more legislative
in character, both in form and substance. The agency solicits comments
from “interested persons”43 and conducts public hearings before
handing down a rule that is prospective in effect and “designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”44 Informal rulemaking
expanded dramatically.45 In part, this reflected choices on the part of
agencies to use informal rulemaking more, choices given blessing by the
courts.46
The expanded turn to informal rulemaking also reflected a deliberate
design choice by Congress to vest agencies with rulemaking power as a
principal policy tool. For instance, the landmark Clean Air Act of 1970
gave EPA the power and responsibility to use rules to improve air
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quality.47 The Congressional choice reflected, among other things, a
sense that a wide-ranging policy process, open to environmental groups
as well as affected industries, would yield fair policy outcomes. The
legislative history for the statute showed a conscious choice to harness
public participation both in standard setting, through the notice and
comment process, and in enforcement, through the statute’s citizen-suit
provision. In language that could have been borrowed from David
Truman, the Act’s chief sponsor, Edmund Muskie, justified public
participation in the creation of state-level enforcement plans on the
grounds that the public could thereby “bring the most effective pressure
to bear for clean air.”48
3. Challenges to Pluralism
Ultimately, however, efforts to make the administrative process more
pluralist did not stem criticism of agency performance, which continued
to lag.49 By the early 1960s, the new field of public choice scholarship
offered a persuasive social science explanation for agency failure that
directly challenged the premises of pluralism. Launched by such works
as Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent,50 public choice sought
47
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to apply the tools and concepts of economics to the operation of
government and the production of public policy. Public choice analyses
gave reasons to expect that agencies would predictably and
systematically fail to translate interest group preferences into policies in
an even-handed way.51 Crucially, this is so even if all interest groups in
principle have equal access to the levers of regulatory policymaking,
because their incentives to make use of them differ.52 Public choice
scholarship has catalogued how bureaucratic structures multiply the
possible sources of regulatory dysfunction.53
Even the idea of that individual preferences could be rationally
aggregated into a collective choice—a core premise of pluralist
theory54—came in for challenge during the second half of the twentieth
century. 55 Long ago, the Marquis de Condorcet had demonstrated that
stable individual preferences over policy options can generate unstable
and inconsistent collective choices, when individuals express their
choices by voting.56 In 1951, Kenneth Arrow formalized and extended
51
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the “Condorcet Paradox.” Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem”
demonstrates that there is no principled, fair, and consistent vote
aggregation technique that can reliably translate a diverse set of
preferences into a policy choice.57 Arrow’s work showed that voting
processes are subject to manipulation: he who sets the agenda in many
cases controls the outcome. But more fundamentally, it showed that
majoritarianism, which is so central to the appeal of voting, can be
incoherent as a decision rule, depending on the preferences people hold
over the available policy options.
Some administrative lawyers have recognized the force of the public
choice critique, but none have effectively taken it on board in thinking
about administrative democracy. There is a well-developed body of work
on agencies in the vein of positive political theory, which analyzes
institutional behavior through formalized models, and this is heavily
influenced by public choice insights.58 But the name is telling: positive
political theory is indifferent to normative considerations. Richard
Stewart recognized the force of what amounted to the public choice
critique in his celebrated 1975 article.59 But ultimately that piece
despairs of satisfactorily reconciling administrative practice to our
democratic values.60
B. Civic Republicanism
1. Civic Republican Theory
In more recent years, many influential perspectives on administrative
democracy have borrowed ideas from the civic republican tradition of
political thought. If some pluralists reach back to Madison as an
inspiration, civic republicans can call on an even older tradition, dating
back as far as Aristotle61 and influential among the Framers.62 Rather
than thinking of government as a matter of aggregating the pre-formed
57
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preferences of individuals or groups into policies, republicans offer a
grander conception of the whole political enterprise. The political space
is where individuals come together to forge and pursue a shared vision
of the common good. The key to the process is constructive
engagement among citizens or their representatives with one another,
in the form of thorough, thoughtful deliberation and dialogue. Through
public-minded engagement, republicans come to better understand not
only their political opponents’ views, but their own as well, and to find
common ground. This is a vision of politics that both promises more
than pluralism, but it also requires more of citizens in the way of “civic
virtues”: tolerance, patience, humility, good will, and discernment.
While civic republicanism enjoys a long pedigree, its arrival on the scene
as an influential position within modern political theory is fairly recent.
Civic republicanism experienced newfound interest starting in the
1980s and 1990s.63 Political science had changed since the heyday of
pluralism, and contemplating the nature of democracy was no longer on
the agenda for mainstream political scientists who study American
politics.64 Rather, political theory was increasingly an autonomous
subfield of its own,65 and a number of theorists in the 1980s and 1990s
advanced sophisticated arguments in favor of a civic republican
conception of democracy. In the view of many adherents, civic
republicanism identified a critical failure of pluralist theory: its inability
to account for the polity as a political community, to which its members
were bound by ties of civic obligation. In the words of Michael Sandel
in his influential 1996 book Democracy’s Discontents, “[t]he public
philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it promises,
because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement
that liberty requires.”66
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There is substantial overlap between the perspective of some civic
republicans and theorists of “deliberative democracy,” who began
advancing their ideas around the same time, while marching under their
own banner.67 Deliberative democracy theorists stress the legitimating
force of the dialogic process through which individuals arrive at
collective decisions.68 The arguments advanced by individual theorists
differ in their particulars. In a series of influential works, philosopher
Jürgen Habermas updated Kantian ethics to root the validity of norms
in their capacity to meet with the agreement of all those affected
following a “practical discourse” satisfying certain conditions.69 Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have offered an influential perspective
geared more squarely to the political, and with a particular eye to
American politics.70 In their 1996 book Democracy and Disagreement, they
outlined how deliberation could lead to common ground even on hotbutton topics such as abortion.71
2. In Administrative Law
Some important features of the administrative process, as well as
prominent perspectives for evaluating its performance, are best
understood as reflecting civic republican or deliberative conceptions of
democracy. The person most explicit about drawing these connections
the end of the 1960s, . . . pluralism and liberalism had largely become like
Venus and the evening star.”).
67
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68
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has been Mark Seidenfeld, whose widely-read article A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State appeared in 1992.72 Noting the rise
of civic republican thinking among democratic theorists, Seidenfeld
argues that legislative politics are not equal to the task of promoting
constructive deliberation on the common good. “The structure and
decisionmaking processes of Congress are not conducive to
deliberation,” Seidenfeld asserts, noting that both the intensity of
electoral pressures and the outsourcing of Congress’s work to
committees as obstacles to authentic, broad-based deliberation.73
Instead, Seidenfeld argues, the administrative process offers the best
setting for realizing the civic republican ideal. More insulated from
immediate political pressures than Congress, yet more in touch with
policies and the public than the judiciary, agencies “may be the only
institutions capable of fulfilling the civic republican ideal of deliberative
decision making.”74
The key to realizing that possibility is that agency decision-making
processes must involve open deliberation, informed by participation of
all relevant interests, over what policy choices serve the public interest.
Seidenfeld sees in notice-and-comment rulemaking the potential for a
truly deliberative process: “Comment procedures provide relatively easy
access to the discourse among interest groups and the dialogue between
those groups and decisionmakers.”75
But this potential will not be realized if the agency has already made up
its mind before the rulemaking process begins. Seidenfeld argues that
courts have, and have used, techniques to ensure that the notice-andcomment process is genuinely deliberative, as opposed to mere window
dressing. In his view, courts are right to require agencies to share the
data on which they base their proposals and to go through notice-andcomment again when they change positions, in the interests of
promoting a real engagement between agency leaders and
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stakeholders.76 He also argues that Congress should amend the APA to
deter ex parte contacts, since private communications are at odds with
the ideal of open dialogue.77 The executive branch has a role to play as
well. Since the early 1980s, agencies have been required to submit costbenefit analyses of proposed rules to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for approval.78 Seidenfeld suggests that a process for
presidential review of rulemaking less squarely focused on cost-benefit
analysis could require agency personnel to think more holistically about
their overall missions and how individual rules serve it.79
But Seidenfeld’s principal focus is on courts, and how judicial review can
reinforce deliberative norms. Courts are in a unique position to promote
democratic administration by insisting on the rational justifiability of
agency decisions. Judicial review must test “whether the agency
permitted open discourse, addressed all significant concerns reflected
in the record, and generally provided a persuasive explanation of why its
decision furthers the public interest.”80 To this end, Seidenfeld argues
that courts should require agencies to make explicit how they
understand the public interest in each policy context, and why their
choice best serves that interest, whenever they exercise significant
discretion.81
In many respects, on-the-ground changes in administrative law over the
past several decades resonate with civic republican ideals, as Seidenfeld
acknowledged. The move to promote regulatory negotiation, dating
from the 1980s, aims to make policymaking more genuinely deliberative,
by bringing relevant stakeholders into agencies’ policy processes at an
early stage.82 Also, the presidential rulemaking review process has
changed along the lines that Seidenfeld proposed, at least to some
degree. Executive orders from Presidents Clinton and Obama have
broadened its scope outward from a pure cost-benefit analysis,
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promoting a more wide-ranging exchange between the White House
and agencies on the merits of particular regulatory actions.83
But probably the most important of these changes has been the
adoption of “hard look” review and a stepped-up insistence on reasoned
decision making more generally. The APA gives reviewing courts power
to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion.”84 Historically, arbitrary and capricious review was
famously deferential,85 but starting at the end of the 1960s, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals began using arbitrary and capricious review to
demand that agencies comprehensively justify their policy choices.86 As
Judge Leventhal explained in a 1970 case, a court has a duty to intervene
“if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger
signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient
problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”87 Endorsing hard look review in 1983, the Supreme Court
detailed the obligation it imposed on the agency:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.88
Although courts insisted that hard look review was not unduly intensive,
in fact it frequently placed a demanding burden of justification on the
defendant.89 The coin of the realm in arbitrary and capricious review
had become reasoned decision-making. As the D.C. Circuit explained
in Greater Boston Television Corp.,
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The process [of judicial review] thus combines judicial
supervision with a salutary principle of judicial restraint, an
awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a
‘partnership’ in furtherance of the public interest, and are
‘collaborative instrumentalities of justice.’ The court is in a real
sense part of the total administrative process, and not a hostile
stranger to the office of first instance. . . . Reasoned decision
promotes results in the public interest by requiring the agency to
focus on the values served by its decision, and hence releasing
the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It
furthers the broad public interest of enabling the public to
repose confidence in the process as well as the judgments of its
decision-makers.”90

In other words, reasoned decision making is an acceptable surrogate for
the normal forms of democratic legitimation, because it trains the
agency’s focus on the contemplation of how its policy might best serve
the public interest.91
Much of the scholarship in a civic republican or deliberative vein focuses
on the decision-making process within the agency as the site where
interests and officials come together to hammer out policies in the
public interest. Some scholars highlight that the back-and-forth
between agency and reviewing court can be a “dialogue” with the
potential to enhance the quality and legitimacy of government by
agency. Seidenfeld himself noted that statutory judicial review of
regulations, unlike constitutional review of legislation, can be an
iterative process, in which the agency can respond to the court’s critique
with new justifications.92
Emily Hammond Meazell pushes the idea further, arguing that cases of
“serial litigation” can amount to a court-agency dialogue, “a
conversation in which the participants strive toward learning and
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understanding to promote more effective deliberation and outcomes.”93
On Meazell’s view, the exchanges between courts and agencies are
legitimacy-enhancing, for reasons familiar to proponents of deliberative
democracy: “when an agency clearly explains itself and how its actions
relate to a previous court order [,] interested parties, Congress, and the
courts can more easily understand and respond to their reasoning.”94
3. Challenges to Civic Republicanism
Civic republicanism and deliberative democracy remain very influential
perspectives within contemporary political theory.95 At the same time,
they have been the subject of forceful critiques in recent years. Some
have argued that the civic republican conception of democracy bears no
resemblance to how government operates in modern democracies, and
so is unsuitable even to serve as an aspirational model. In the past few
years, empirical studies and new work in cognitive psychology have also
shed light on how deliberation and reason-giving actually function in
group settings, and these have cast doubt on some civic republicans’
more ambitious claims.
Some critics view the deliberative processes that these models place at
the core of governance unrecognizable as an account of politics, even
best-case-scenario politics. Certainly, as Friedrich Schauer and others
observe with reference to Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, the
deliberations they posit have little in common with the actual political
dialogues that surround us.96 For some, the gap between our politics and
the deliberative ideal is too vast for the theory even to serve as an
model.97
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Also, in recent years, claims made by theorists about the role
deliberation plays in politics have also been subjected to serious social
scientific inquiry.98 Empiricists have begun taking note of deliberative
theory, investigating how deliberation shapes outcomes, using
qualitative case studies, natural experiments, and statistical methods.99
Dennis Thompson, one of the most important figures to advance
deliberative democratic theory in the United States, characterizes the
empirical evidence in support of deliberative democracy theory as
“mixed or inconclusive.”100 Some of the studies even show that realworld deliberative processes tend to exacerbate, rather than reduce,
power differentials between participants and lead to substantively worse
decisions than non-deliberative processes.101
Recent work in evolutionary psychology has also challenged the
presuppositions of some deliberative theorists. The so-called
argumentative theory of reasoning posits that reason evolved not to
search for the truth, but to persuade others. Some logical flaws in one’s
reasoning, such as an inability to recognize the weaknesses of one’s own
position, may not be aberrations, but hard-wired features of human
cognition.102 While it does not follow that deliberation cannot produce
agreement or better outcomes, it suggests that its ability to do so
depends heavily on context. Cognitive scientist Hugo Mercier has
identified the failure of democratic debate in the United States as a
impasses. In a world where deliberation can work, deliberation won’t have
work to do: “[i]n an ideal world, people would not have the kinds of belief that
deliberation would talk them out of.” Id. At 24.
98
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99
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IMPLICATIONS (2012).
100
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101
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WORK (2002).
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Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCI. 57 (2011); Hugo
Mercier & Hélène Landemore, Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the
Successes and Failures of Deliberation, 33 POLIT. PSYCH. 243 (2012).
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function of the high-stakes, histrionic, adversarial nature of our
contemporary politics.103 Taken together, the recent social scientific
scholarship underlines how contingent it is for deliberation to lead to
better outcomes that enjoy an enhanced sense of legitimacy.104
C. Presidentialism
1. Presidentialism in Theory
Particularly if pluralism and civic republicanism seem to ask more from
government than it can realistically deliver, a presidentialist conception
of democracy may look like an appealing alternative. Presidentialists
emphasize the privileged connection the President has to the people, as
the sole governmental official who represents—and is electorally
accountable to—the entire electorate. Since the 1980s, presidentfocused approaches to thinking about democracy have been influential
within administrative law.
Legislatures, of course, are also elected. But presidentialists tend to take
a dim view of legislative politics, as a sordid business of horse-trading
that really only serves the interests of the well-connected. The
President, by contrast, who has a distance from the backroom dealing
of the legislature, comes into office with an electoral mandate to
advance the People’s agenda. Presidential elections are plebiscites, in
which the electorate chooses a leader based on his personal qualities and
the political program that he offers. Relative to the legislature, the
executive also has advantages in terms of effectiveness and
responsiveness. Generally, then, it is democracy-enhancing to reduce
obstacles to the President’s pursuit of his agenda.
Political economists have argued that presidential government tends to
produce results with majority support.105 But conceptions of democracy
103

Patricia Cohen, Reason Seen More as Weapon Than Path to Truth, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2011.
104
See also Bächtiger et al., Deliberation in Legislatures: Antecedents and Outcomes,
in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE
GOVERN? 82, 92-97 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007) (identifying, through an
empirical study of different legislatures, institutional and attitudinal
preconditions for high-quality deliberation).
105
See, e.g., ARENDT LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER
SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 151 (2008) (“My
overall conclusion can be summarized in three words: presidentialism spells
majoritarianism.”). See also Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (providing a positive political theory
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that identify a single individual as the bearer of the democratic will find
scant support within contemporary political theory. 106 In the words of
political theorist Jeff Green, “plebiscitary democracy [] is almost
universally considered a profanity by democratic theorists committed
to an ethical understanding of political life.”107 Presidentialist
conceptions of democracy typically rest, at least in part, on the
plebiscitarian idea that a popular vote for a leader legitimates the actions
he takes once in office. Political theorists tend to be wary of
plebicitarians’ valorization of executive power, and consider it a short
trip from plebiscitarianism to authoritarianism.108
And in fact, the historical associations of plebiscitarianism should at
least give pause to democrats attracted to presidentialism. Even the
name assigned to the phenomenon of plebiscitary democracy by Max
Weber—Führerdemokratie—could count for many as an argument against
seriously entertaining the theory.109 The fact that plebiscitary
democracy counted among its most enthusiastic advocates Carl
Schmitt, the “crown jurist of the Third Reich,”110 compounds its image
problem. But, as discussed further below,111 guilt by association is not
the only reason why presidentialist conceptions of democracy have
found little favor among contemporary theorists.
2. As Applied to Administrative Law
The fact that presidentialist ideas have not been embraced by
contemporary political theorists has not kept them from having an
impact. To be sure, even the most aggressive proponents of executive
power in American government come nowhere close to

analysis of the relationship between presidential control and majoritarianism
in practice).
106
There is, on the other hand, a substantial body of positive scholarship on
presidential politics, which emphasizes the unique institutional characteristics
of the Presidency. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
PRESIDENTS MAKE (1993).
107
JEFFREY E. GREEN, THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE
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Id. at 142.
110
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authoritarianism.112 Still, there were important changes to
administrative law starting in the 1980s that tended to amplify executive
power,113 and the justifications for these changes tended to echo the
presidentialist conception of the President as the People’s
representative in government.
The revival of conservative legal theory that began in the 1970s brought
the concept of the unitary executive to renewed prominence by the
1980s.114 Unitary executive arguments, which found vigorous champions
within the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, were mounted
to oppose limitations on the President’s control over the executive
branch.
The unitary executive belonged to constitutional theory, not political
theory: the claim was that an undivided executive power, with all lines
of authority terminating in the President, was part of the original
constitutional design.115 But the constitutional arguments were often
bolstered with normative claims on behalf of the desirability of a unitary
and strong executive. Steven Calabresi develops some of these
arguments at length in an article specifically about the normative case
for the unitary executive.116 In Calabresi’s view, a unitary executive is
necessary to compensate for what he views as the manifest and
unavoidable dysfunctions of legislative politics in the modern welfare
state. Electoral incentives encourage wasteful spending that benefits
individual districts over the commonweal, while the committee system
gives members quasi-executive powers that those same electoral
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incentives encourage them to misuse.117 Only a President fully in control
of the Executive Branch has the capacity to confront the “congressional
redistributive collective action problem.”118 And it is pro-democratic for
the President to do so, since he has the “national voice”: “he, and he
alone, speaks for the entire American people.””119
Not all arguments favoring expanded presidential power are rooted in
the Constitution or advanced by conservatives. Elena Kagan justified
the President’s aggressive use of the administrative process to advance a
policy agenda in her influential article Presidential Administration, which
draws particularly on the experiences of the Clinton presidency.120
Kagan strongly endorses the process for the presidential review of
agency rulemaking under the auspices of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), as initiated by President Reagan and expanded under
President Clinton.121 She also argued in support of President Clinton’s
practice of issuing directives to agencies to take particular regulatory
actions.122 Kagan’s argument was not that this degree of presidential
control was constitutionally compelled, but rather that it was
normatively desirable, because “presidential control of administration .
. . possesses advantages over any alternative control device in advancing
these core democratic values.”123 Kagan’s chief argument is a
prospectively plebiscitarian one: a President has not only won a national
election, but will face a second one, and to maintain favor with the
national constituency will predictably choose policies that “reflect the
preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial
interests.”124
Lastly, a presidentialist conception of democracy has been used to justify
the most written-about administrative law phenomenon of the last
thirty-plus years: Chevron deference. In Chevron, USA Inc. v. National
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Resources Defense Council,125 the Supreme Court held that courts should
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that
they administer. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens offered this
rationale:
In these cases, the Administrator’s interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests,
and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both
interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity
presented by these cases. . . .
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices—
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities.126
Chevron was significant not least because it offered a new conception of
what was at stake in statutory interpretation, one that implied new roles
for legislature, court, and executive. Interpretive questions amount to
policy choices, and the President should make the choice precisely
because of his tight electoral connection to the American people.
3. Challenges to Presidentialism
The embrace of presidentialism within administrative law could be
understood, in part, as a result of disillusionment with pluralist and civic
republican models of democracy. Compared to these more ambitious
125
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theories, presidentialism sets its sights lower—and in this respect, it
resembles minimalism. The popular election of a President surely
provides at least some legitimacy for the President’s acts. And the
energy in the executive,127 at least in comparison with the sclerotic
legislature, opens the possibility that more executive power means more
responsive government.
But if other theories promise too much, the problem with
presidentialism is that it promises too little. Surely this is true of
presidentialism in its strongly plebiscitary form. Such a view treats
national elections, by themselves, as sufficient to legitimate the
subsequent acts of the President. It follows, within this perspective, that
the removal of obstacles to executive power is democracy-enhancing. A
conception of democracy this thin offers no principled basis for a
critique of autocratic government, so long as it features periodic
elections.128
There is a more moderate presidentialist view, that emphasizes how the
electoral constraint tends to align presidential policies with majoritarian
preferences.129 That may be true, but that constraint may not exhaust
what we may legitimately expect from democracy. Standing for
presidential elections may align the winning candidate’s platform,
however loosely, with the wishes of the majority, at least on some major
issues. But whatever force that argument has for the first term, it loses
on the first day of the second term. And even well-functioning
majoritarian processes can run roughshod over minority interests.
Reducing democracy to presidential elections leaves us with no
conceptual tools, for instance, for articulating why the protection of
minorities is relevant to democracy.
Presidentialism defines democratic commitments so far down as to very
nearly throw in the towel and give up on democracy entirely. As
described further below, minimalism offers a conception of democracy
that is more demanding than presidentialism, but still more attainable
than pluralism and civic republicanism.
III. TOWARDS A MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY
127
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The previous Part outlines those stands of democratic theory that have
been the most influential in the field of administrative law. The claim is
not that judges or scholars have always consciously or explicitly drawn
on political theory. Rather, I have argued that over the past half century,
when administrative lawyers have had occasion to think about what
democracy means, their answers have tended to line up with one or
more of these families of theories. This alignment is not surprising, since
(with the exception of presidentialism) these approaches to thinking
about democracy have enjoyed broad currency among political scientists
and political theorists within this period.
But importantly, these approaches to thinking about democracy have
also been subject to substantial criticism. Administrative law as a field
has not yet come to terms with these critiques, even when actors in the
administrative law system have recognized and tried to remedy gaps
between theory and reality. For instance, as discussed above,130 the
“reformation” of administrative law described by Richard Stewart was a
response to the perceived failure of the administrative process to deliver
on the promises of democratic pluralism. But the response itself was
predicated on the pluralist premise that the fundamental precondition
for democratic governance is establishing a level playing field for
interest group politics.
This Part outlines a minimalist conception of democracy capable of
being applied to the administrative process, and built around the
concept of non-domination—in essence, the idea that people should not
be vulnerable in their basic interests to arbitrary or unfair exercises of
power.131 This is a minimalist theory, in that it in that seeks to set a lower
bar for what it means to be democratic than most traditional theories
of democracy, while at the same time still capturing core democratic
commitments. Others have propounded different minimalist
conceptions of democracy that are not based on non-domination.132 In
130
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other words, one could reject the specific conception of democracy
offered here and still accept the case for minimalism more generally.
One advantage of a theory of democracy rooted in the concept of nondomination is that it is not tethered to any particular set of institutions
or practices. This makes it “portable,” in the sense that it can be applied
in multiple contexts, including the administrative state.133
One might fault the whole project of minimalist theory for being
defeatist. Is there not something deflating about settling for minimally
democratic administrative law? Would we not be better off aiming for a
more demanding democratic ideal, even if in practice we were likely to
fall short?
There are two responses to this point. First, adopting minimalist theory
may not involve settling at all. Minimalists would argue not that they
offer a watered-down democratic theory, but a pure and vital one that
zeroes in on the values right at the heart of our democratic impulses.
The second point is that there are reasons to believe that the theory of
second best may apply. 134 In certain contexts, aiming for an achievable
second-best outcome leads to better results than pursuing an
unobtainable first-best.135 Here, pursing of a demanding conception of
democracy may lead to worse outcomes in the administrative contexts,
by the lights of most observers, than aiming for a less demanding
standard. A number of scholars have argued that the notice-andcomment rulemaking process, with its judicially-enforced emphasis on
participation and deliberation, amounts to a kind of Kabuki theater, in
which agencies put on a show for the benefit of courts.136 Agency
lawyers dutifully package regulations with the justifications that they
minimalism. RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 14357 (2009).
133
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134
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believe will satisfy courts, which may have little to do with the agency’s
real reasons for acting.137 And it is widely believed that demanding
judicial review standards contribute to the ossification of the
rulemaking process, generating delays and reducing agencies’ functional
rulemaking capacity.138 Even persons who subscribe to a richer
conception of democracy may conclude that taking minimalism as a
lodestar for administrative practices yields better outcomes, if it means
avoiding some of these pathologies.
This Part locates the seeds for modern minimalism in the work of
Joseph Schumpeter, and then outlines, in broad terms, a contemporary
minimalist conception of democracy, drawing in particular on the work
of political theorist Ian Shapiro.
A. Schumpeterian Minimalism
Joseph Schumpeter is widely regarded as the godfather of modern
democratic minimalism.139 Though Schumpeter is best known for his
work as an economist, his 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
contained two chapters on democratic theory that proved to be widely
influential.140 Schumpeter anticipated many of the modern critiques of
what he termed the “classical doctrine of democracy.” Schumpeter
argued that the touchstones of traditional democratic theory—the
common good and the will of the people—were chimerical, and that our
best efforts to aggregate individual preferences into policy are unlikely
137
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to yield “what people really want.”141 He argued that citizens generally
failed to take a sober and serious interest in the finer points of national
political issues—and that it would be unreasonable to expect them to.142
Schumpeter hammered political scientists of his day for offering
panglossian theories of democracy that had nothing in common with
political realities.143
In contrast, Schumpeter offers a very different, and decidedly
unromantic, understanding of what democracy at root is about. For
Schumpeter, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”144
Entirely absent in this conception is any suggestion that “the people”
are meaningfully engaged in a project of self-rule. The nearest thing
democracy can offer in this direction is the disciplining force of a
market—the market for votes—that incentivizes leaders to align policy
choices with public preferences, at least broadly. The ever-present
possibility of being voted out of office provides insurance against
abusive or autocratic rule. A functioning democracy also necessarily
provides a nimbus of freedoms that are preconditions for the
competitive struggle for votes that Schumpeter describes.145
B. Modern Democratic Minimalism
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy had an “extraordinary impact,”
influencing a diverse set of scholars,146 including several contemporary
theorists. Schumpeter’s work is often regarded as conservative, whether
owing to his low regard for the capacity of the average voter or from
association with his staunchly capitalist economic theories. But
141
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importantly, contemporary work shows that there is nothing inherently
conservative about democratic minimalism.147
In addition to political scientists working with minimalist conceptions
of democracy, there are a number contemporary political theorists who
posits non-domination as a core political ideal. Ian Shapiro in particular
has made the argument, in detail and at length, that non-domination is
a democratic ideal, because it speaks to the most basic concerns of
democratic theory. As mentioned above, a minimalist theory of
democracy based on the concept of non-domination, as opposed to
around specific electoral processes or institutions, recommends itself to
the present project because it can be fairly readily applied to the
administrative context.148 But it is by no means the only minimalist
approach to democracy.
For Schumpeter, the touchstone of democracy is competitive elections.
But in what way exactly do competitive elections serve a democratic
ideal, if voting does not unproblematically aggregate individual
preferences or else express some general will? Shapiro offers an answer:
Competitive elections prevent any one group from monopolizing power
over the long term, and thereby dominating others. It is difficult to
define exactly what collective self-rule entails, but far easier to identify
what negates it: domination by others. And so for Shapiro, democracy
is ultimately “a means of managing power relations so as to minimize
domination.”149
The problem of domination has received sustained attention from
political theorists in recent decades.150 The concept of domination
figures importantly in the work of Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault,
Michael Walzer, Quintin Skinner, and Phillip Petit, among others.151
Theorists commonly understand domination to be a particular kind of
147
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unfreedom that results from abuses of power.152 In one formulation,
domination is “subjection to the whims or arbitrary will of another.”153
In the formulation favored by Shapiro, domination involves having one’s
basic interests systematically disregarded in contexts where they should
matter. Basic interests are the most fundamental ones: persons have
basic interests “in the security, nutrition, health, and education needed
to develop into, and live as, normal adults,” and in “developing the
capacities needed to function effectively in the prevailing economic,
technological, and institutional system, governed as a democracy over
the course of their lives.”154
If older democrats did not use the language of domination, it was
nonetheless of concern to them. Madison famously argued for an
extended republic in Federalist 10 precisely because in a large and
diverse society, there is no “majority faction” with homogeneous
interests that could run the table on politics, getting its way on every
issue.155 In other words, the extended republic is a device to protect
against domination.
Because domination is a function of the power dynamics rather than the
formalities of relationships, identifying it in practice always requires
context-specific judgments. Shapiro writes that hierarchies, for
instance, merit scrutiny for their potential to “atrophy into illicit
systems of domination,”156 but they are not necessarily illegitimate:
“There is a world of difference, for instance, between a teacher’s
requiring a student to do her homework and his taking advantage of his
powerful position to engage in sexual harassment of her. The latter is
domination, but the former is not.”157 Ultimately, the aim of democratic
government is “to enable people, as much as possible, to pursue the
activities that give life its meaning and purpose while limiting the
potential for domination that accompanies those activities.”158
If non-domination is the touchstone of democratic legitimacy, Shapiro
offers a number of off-the-shelf institutional strategies that can be
152
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employed in different settings to bring decision-processes more in line
with democratic norms. Perhaps the most basic is the principle of
affected interests: “everyone affected by the operation of a particular
domain of civil society should be presumed to have a say in its
governance.”159 Context is key: what is essential is that the basic
interests of persons are taken into account when decisions affect them,
whatever the mechanism. Importantly, for Shapiro the right to have a
stake in decision making is not premised on anything so grandiose as a
belief that deliberation will produce consensus among stakeholders.
Rather, it serves as a warrant against domination. Having one’s views
taken into consideration in a decision-making process is incompatible
with true domination.
It bears emphasis that Shapiro presents non-domination as a democratic
ideal, as opposed to, for instance, just an ideal of justice. Nondomination, on this view, is something like the lowest common
denominator of democratic theory, a value immanent in all reasonable
conceptions of democracy. This minimalist approach to democracy
recommends itself to the extent that the ambitions of conventional
theories of democracy—to arrive at a common good or collective will by
aggregating individual preferences or deliberating—are unattainable.160
This conception of democracy is minimalist but not proceduralist, in
that the principle of non-denomination provides a substantive yardstick
to evaluate whether outcomes are truly democratic.
This conception of democracy, like most political theory constructs, is
pitched at a high level of generality. By itself, the theory has limited
resolving power, as its key operative terms are fairly open-ended.
Deciding actual cases will require making choices, including choices
about what counts as basic interests and domination. The next Part
illustrates one set of possibilities for how this approach to thinking
about democracy could inform how courts carry out judicial review.
IV. MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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A. Defining the Task
The aim of this Part is to consider democratic minimalism as a
normative yardstick for administrative law, and specifically, for the
judicial review of agencies by courts.161 This Part does not offer a
wholesale reimagining of the field of administrative law from the
minimalist perspective, which is well beyond the scope of a single law
review article. The focus here is deliberately restricted to the judicial
review of agency actions, and further, to a few key topics within judicial
review.
The arguments made in this Part are best understood as answers to the
question: from the perspective of democratic minimalism, how can
judicial review best enhance the democratic legitimacy of agency action?
There are two points that need to be made at the outset about this way
of framing the question.
First, the democratic mode of legitimation is not the only one available
for uses of public power. For instance, judicial decisions are generally
considered legitimate not because judges are elected,162 but because of
the impartiality of judges and the procedural fairness of trials.163 In
administrative law, agency adjudication is structured as a quasi-judicial
proceeding, with APA provisions guaranteeing an impartial decision
maker164 and procedural fairness.165 In highly technical contexts, subject161

This Part represents my own application of the minimalist conception of
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specific expertise may properly play a legitimating role in agency
decision making.166
It is in areas where agencies make significant policy choices—where
they are performing a role similar to the legislature’s—that the need for
democratic legitimation is highest. Agencies typically make these
choices in the context of rulemakings, and accordingly, the discussion
below focuses mostly on judicial review of rulemaking.167 But of course,
even in the context of agency policy choices, judicial review does not
only exist to ensure that administrative actions are democratically
legitimate. most important rationale judicial review exists for the sole
purpose of. Judicial review serves a number of other ends as well, such
as vindicating individual legal entitlements, and Congress has often
crafted agency-specific judicial review provisions for context-specific
reasons.168 While the discussion below focuses to judicial review’s
capacity to reduce domination, in a bigger picture perspective, this is
one function to be balanced against others.
Second, to ask how judges can enhance the democratic legitimacy of the
administrative process arguably treats courts as standing outside of the
system of government and the pull of politics altogether. It is standard
operating procedure for legal scholarship to instruct courts in how they
should do their work, but doing so implicitly extends to judges more
benefit of the doubt than other officials typically receive. A prescription
aimed at courts will only be effective to the extent that judges perform
166

Expertise was perhaps the leading rationale for delegations to agencies
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Because agencies are permitted to make policy also through adjudications,
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See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the
Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625 (2015) (discussing different
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in good faith, unswayed by strategic or political considerations of their
own. But the idea that courts can be trusted is more often assumed than
argued for.
This is a fair criticism to level at most work that looks to courts to
ameliorate the political dysfunctions of other institutions, including this
piece. But while accepting the criticism, I argue that applies here in
slightly attenuated form. Precisely because minimalism prescribes a
baseline norm of low-intensity review (as described further below), it
expects less of courts, and leaves less scope for judicial self-dealing, than
theories that authorize courts to engage in more searching, wideranging review.169
B. The Basic Framework
I argue from the premises of democratic minimalism for a general
framework for judicial review that combines a baseline norm of lowintensity, reasonableness review with the possibility of elevated scrutiny
when agency actions threaten serious harms to persons’ basic interests.
First, I lay out the basics of the framework, and then I apply it to some
specific aspects of judicial review, making reference to previous cases to
illustrate my points.
1. A Return to Reasonableness
The pluralist and civic republican conceptions of democracy call for
vigorous judicial review. This is so because they set a high bar for what
counts as democratically legitimate administrative actions. Agencies’
processes must be solicitous of all of the groups with an interest in the
action in question, and on equal terms. Agencies must give a hard look
to all of the arguments proffered by the various stakeholders, and
explain in detail why the chosen course of action is justified in light of
them. Reviewing courts, in turn, must apply ample scrutiny to the
agency’s action to verify that the agency has cleared the bar.
From a minimalist perspective, the pluralist and civic republican
conceptions of democracy demand more than is realistic from agencies.
Accordingly, agencies will consistently fail to clear the bar the bar that
they set, which means that reviewing courts applying these standards
169
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will constantly be setting aside agency action. But there is no reason to
suppose that frequent judicial invalidations will systematically make
agency outcomes more meaningfully democratic. The predictable
consequence of having courts require agencies to meet unrealistic
standards of inclusion and rationality is, instead, the ossification of
agency processes.
As a general matter, then, minimalism counsels in favor of restraint
when it comes to the judicial review of agencies. A reviewing court is
not looking for a perfect weighing of the different interests at stake, or
a comprehensively rational justification of the agency’s action. Instead,
a court is looking to see that no one is being systematically disregarded
or arbitrarily harmed in decisions that adversely affect his or her basic
interests. Below, I discuss what should trigger additional scrutiny, and
what form that scrutiny should take. The default position, however,
should be a basic reasonableness review.
As Justice Frankfurter put it, judicial standards of review can really only
express a mood,170 and “reasonableness” can convey varying degrees of
laxity.171 At the limit, reasonableness review can entail hardly any review
at all, as in the British Wednesbury standard,172 which will only flunk an
agency decision “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it.”173 “Rational basis with
bite” is nearer the mark: more intensive than Wednesbury, but less
intensive than full hard look.174 I discuss further what kinds of agency
justifications survive reasonableness review below.175
2. Varying the Intensity of Review
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It has been argued that the existing standards of judicial review already
amount to a single reasonableness requirement.176 In fact, though, the
evidence suggests that there is substantial variability in how intensively
review is carried out in practice. Significantly, doctrine seems to provide
less guidance as to how the intensity of review varies than one might
hope: courts do not agree, for instance, on whether substantial evidence
review is more stringent than, less stringent than, or equivalent in
stringency to arbitrary and capricious review. 177 At the same time, there
appear to be variations in the intensity of review actually applied by
courts that are wholly unconnected to doctrine. For instance, certain
agencies appear to routinely receive more deference from courts than
others.178 There are some areas of doctrine that address how the
intensity of review varies: for instance, with respect to agency statutory
interpretations, Chevron review is more deferential than Skidmore
review,179 and the intensity of Skidmore review varies depending on
features of the agency’s interpretation. But these are the exception
rather than the rule: for the most part, the law is unclear on how the
intensity of review should vary across contexts.
Minimalism offers a useful guiding principle with respect to the basic
question of how the intensity of judicial review should vary. If
democracy at root is about non-domination, then judicial review is
democracy-enhancing when it is deployed to detect and correct
situations where parties’ basic interests are unjustifiably disregarded
with results that cause them serious harm. Reasonableness review is
appropriate as a baseline norm, but harms to the basic interests of
affected parties can trigger a higher duty of justification.
To be more specific, courts should depart from the norm of relaxed
review when a party plausibly claims that an agency inappropriately
disregarded its legitimate interests, or otherwise acted so arbitrarily as
to constitute an abuse of power, resulting in serious harm to the party.
Under these circumstances, hard look review and associated doctrines—
the requirement that agencies respond to all significant comments;180
the requirement that agencies make available the data that support their
176

See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 2317 (2010).
Different courts have given all three answers. See Mathews, supra note 89.
178
See Kathryn Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90
INDIANA L.J. 1207 (2015).
179
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
180
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
177

MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

45

action181—should apply with full effect. The court should ask: Did the
agency give an adequate, contemporaneous response to the arguments
made by the claimant? Has the agency demonstrated that it considered
alternatives that are less burdensome to the adversely affected? Has it
given adequate reasons for choosing the policy it selected over those
alternatives? Ordinarily, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether
the agency adequately took into account the interests of those affected
by its decision. But an agency’s disregard of other relevant, important
factors and other blatant errors could also be grounds for setting aside
its decision, since truly arbitrary uses of power that cause potent harms
can also amount to domination.182
This framework for review is broadly similar in spirit to proposals some
scholars have made to peg the intensity of review to the openness of the
agency’s process to interest group input.183 It also resonates with
doctrines governing intensity of review in some other administrative law
systems. For instance, a general principle of European Union Law is
proportionality: the benefits from measures must justify the burdens
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they impose on adversely affected parties.184 Proportionality review can
be conducted with greater or lesser deference to the judgments of
policymakers. And proportionality applies less deferentially the more
that especially important interests—those protected by rights—are
implicated.185 In other words, the more a decision affects basic interests,
the more intensively the court will scrutinize the government’s
justification for it.
To make matters more concrete, I offer four cases help to demonstrate
how the framework could apply, and to illustrate where it would both
overlap with and differ from current practices. The analysis in all cases
reflects a series of contestable judgments: about what kind of harms
should trigger heightened scrutiny; about what different levels of
scrutiny mean in practice; and to what extent the decisions under
consideration aligned with the framework considered here. For these
reasons, the discussion shows what minimally democratic judicial review
could look like in practice, rather than what it must look like.
Two cases (FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.186 and Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Insurance187) are offered to show,
respectively, how courts should and should not review run-of-the-mill
agency policy choices. The other two cases (Judulang v. Holder188 and
Industrial Union Dep’t, ALF-CIO v. Hodgson189) are offered to show,
respectively, how courts should and should not conduct review when
agency action threatens serious harm to parties’ basic interests.
Fox Television Stations concerned a challenge to a change in FCC policy
regarding the broadcast of “fleeting expletives”: non-repetitive, nonliteral uses of vulgar language. After fielding numerous complaints
following a series of live award show broadcasts in which celebrities
indulged in salty language,190 the agency eliminated a safe harbor that
184
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had previously shielded fleeting expletives from liability under the
indecency standards.191 Broadcasters challenged the action as arbitrary
and capricious and won below, but lost before the Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the suggestion that the
reasons for the agency’s new approach to fleeting expletives needed to
be better than the reasons for its past policy: “it suffices that the new
policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for
it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious
change of course adequately indicates.”192 The reasons the agency gave
for expanding the scope of enforcement—that literal and nonliteral uses
of offensive words were equally indecent; that isolated utterances could
be harmful to children and lead to more uses of offensive language—
were “entirely rational.”193 The Court’s majority also disagreed with the
dissenting justices’ conclusion that the agency was insufficiently
attentive to the First Amendment implications of its policy.194
The Supreme Court applied only moderate scrutiny to the FCC’s order.
The Court required reasons for the agency’s action, but not a
demonstration that this action was better than the alternatives. Nor did
the Court require as exacting an analysis of the order’s collateral impacts
as the dissent would have demanded. From the perspective of
democratic minimalism, nothing more was required to ensure that the
agency’s action was legitimate. The interests at stake were important; in
litigation, they almost always are.195 But the FCC’s action did not pose
a serious threat to anyone’s basic interests.196 Insofar as judicial review
in a democratic state should be aimed at protecting persons against
domination by agency power, the kind of reasonableness review that the
majority provided was sufficient.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rescind a passive
restraint requirement for new cars. The agency had explained that,
contrary to its initial projections, most auto manufacturers would meet
the requirement through the use of detachable automatic seatbelts, and
191
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that these seatbelts would have a limited impact on safety, since many
users would disconnect them.197
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, put the
agency’s arguments through the wringer. What were the agency’s
reasons for rescinding the rule entirely, instead of adopting an airbagsonly requirement?198 Also, studies showed most people used safety belts
some of the time. Might this mean that people who disconnected
automatic seatbelts would later reconnect them, and then leave them
attached?199 And why was the agency so quick to reject continuous
passive belts? The Court was unconvinced by the agency’s arguments
that these were unpopular with the public and less safe than other
options.200
State Farm is famous as the Supreme Court’s foray into “hard look”
arbitrary and capricious view, in the form pioneered by the D.C.
Circuit.201 But from the minimalist perspective, the State Farm majority’s
approach looks like overkill, given the nature of the dispute. It is
arguably a close question, but I would argue that NHTSA’s rule
rescission did not pose a serious threat to persons’ basic interests.202
Nonetheless, the Court insisted on a maximally comprehensive
justification for the agency’s choice, requiring in effect that the agency
demonstrate the superiority of its choices over alternatives. This kind
of strict insistence on comprehensive justifications makes sense if the
touchstone of administrative legitimacy is the comprehensiveness of its
deliberations. But for democratic minimalists, the reason-giving
requirement has the more modest goal of ensuring that the agency has
not irrationally or maliciously caused serious harm to persons’ basic
interests. Accordingly, a lesser measure of scrutiny would be
appropriate.
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Judulang concerned a challenge to a policy of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) regarding eligibility to apply for a form of discretionary
relief from deportation. Prior to 1996 revisions to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), aliens who sought entry to the United States but
faced exclusion—generally on the grounds that they had committed
criminal offenses specified in the statute, could seek discretionary relief
from exclusion.203 Executive action and judicial decisions had extended
the eligibility to apply for relief to aliens facing deportation, but the BIA
had to determine which aliens in deportation proceedings were eligible.
Under the “comparable grounds” approach, aliens could apply for relief
if the ground for their deportation was comparable to a ground for
exclusion listed in the INA. An alien who was denied the opportunity
for relief challenged the policy as arbitrary and capricious. In an opinion
written by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court
concluded that the criterion that the agency used to determine
eligibility was “irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country”
and was therefore not a reasoned exercise of discretion.204
From a democratic minimalism perspective, the Judulang decision gets
it right. The context—setting the criteria governing eligibility for relief
from deportation—is one in which persons’ basic interests are at stake.
In such a context, it is appropriate for a court to demand a showing that
the agency’s decision has adequately taken account of the interests at
stake. The Court in Judulang insists it is applying only requiring that the
agency’s decision be rational, and that it cannot “discern a reason for
it”.205 In fact, the agency gives three reasons for its policy, relating to
text, history, and cost;206 the Court has really concluded that the
agency’s reasons are not good enough. And given the stakes for the
people affected by the agency’s action, the Court is right to insist on a
high standard of reasoned decisionmaking here.
That insistence was lacking, at least in part, from the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in the Hodgson case. The case concerned a challenge to an
asbestos standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Petitioners, the union representing workers
exposed to asbestos in their workplaces, challenged a number of aspects
of OSHA’s “two fiber” standard, including a four-year delay before its
203
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implementation. The petitioners argued that the implementation lag
posed a health hazard for workers. The Court had this to say on the
subject:
We cannot say, on the basis of the conflicting testimony in the
record, that the Secretary erred in his prediction of the health
effect of the four year delay, but neither can we say that
employees are not exposed to some additional risk of disease
because of greater exposure. In view of the Act’s express
allowance for problems of feasibility, the Secretary’s decision to
allow a four year delay is not irrational with regard to those
industries that require that long to meet the standard. It is
appropriate to allow sufficient time to permit an orderly
industry-wide transition since, in those cases, the indeterminate
degree of risk involved is counterbalanced by considerations of
feasibility; it is not, however, a risk to which employees should
be needlessly exposed.207
This is an issue that implicates workers’ basic interests in life and health.
Given the stakes, the Court should demand better reasons for delaying
the standard than that implementation may involve “problems of
feasibility” and that allowing the delay is “not irrational.”208 In the
Court’s defense, it may be that the judges gave scant attention to this
particular issue because they found the delay unsupported on other
grounds.209
C. What Kinds of Reasons Must Agencies Give?
We can get a sense for what reasonableness review means by reflecting
on an ongoing debate about what kinds of reasons are admissible to
justify agency actions.
The reason-giving requirement is foundational to modern
administrative law.210 But what kinds of reasons must agencies give for
their actions to pass judicial muster? Courts have sometimes set a very
high bar indeed for what counts as an adequate justification for an
agency action. The Supreme Court’s landmark State Farm case, discussed
above, illustrates the point. As a practical matter, the majority
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demanded that the agency demonstrate why its policy was superior to
possible alternatives that the agency could have adopted.
Dissenting in State Farm, Justice Rehnquist believed that the reason for
the agency’s change of course on passive restraints was obvious and
adequate:
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is
readily apparent that the responsible members of one
administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties
to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous
administration. A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within
the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the
philosophy of the administration.211
Drawing in part on Justice Rehnquist’s State Farm dissent, Kathryn
Watts has developed the argument that—within carefully specified
limits—courts should be receptive to agency justifications of their
choices that make reference to political factors.212 For instance, where
both Options A and B are permissible under the statute, the agency
should be allowed to explain that it chose Option A because it better
aligns with the President’s agenda.213
Watt’s argument has been controversial, with some scholars arguing that
letting politics in to judicial review erodes the legitimacy of the
administrative process.214 But from the perspective of democratic
minimalism, there is nothing wrong with justifying administrative
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decisions with reference to legitimate political considerations.215
Minimalism offers a less demanding conception of democracy than
most of its competitors, and a less demanding set of legitimacy
conditions translates into a larger set of reasons for agency action that
count as legitimate. Within this perspective, a political explanation for
an otherwise reasonable policy choice is good enough. If political
influences on agencies’ decisions are not democratically disqualifying,
and to a minimalist they are not, then there is no reason to prohibit
agencies from acknowledging them. Among other benefits, permitting
agencies to acknowledge political influences could help put an end to
the tiresome charade in which agencies pretend that the reasons they
state publicly are the reasons for their actions, and the courts pretend
to believe them.
D. Chevron Revisited
This simple framework for judicial review can be integrated with
doctrinal structures designed for particular contexts within
administrative law, such as the judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations. In administrative law, debate over how courts should
review agency interpretations of statutes revolves around discussions of
Chevron deference: what exactly it entails, and when it should apply. This
section brings the minimalist framework to bear on how and when
Chevron should operate.
Famously, the 1984 case Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,216 defines a two-step inquiry for reviewing courts when
evaluating agency constructions of statutes that they administer. First,
the court asks whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise
question at issue in the statute. If the answer is yes, then Congress’s
intent, as expressed in the statute, controls. If the answer is no—that is,
if the statute is ambiguous with respect to the question—then the court
is to uphold the agency’s construction so long as it is reasonable.
Chevron, like minimalism itself, is a doctrine of “good enough.” An
agency’s interpretation of a statute doesn’t have to be the best
interpretation from the reviewing court’s perspective: it will be upheld
so long as it is reasonable. Chevron also shares with democratic
215
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minimalism a certain political realism, at least when compared with its
competitors. Chevron receives the attention it does in part because of
its unprecedented, candid acknowledgment that questions of statutory
interpretation, far from being merely matter of legal technique, really
are stalking horses for political choices. If the gaps in statutes really are
opportunities to make policy choices, Chevron argued, they are better
made by executive branch officials than courts.
One of the questions arising under Chevron concerns the nature of the
review courts are to conduct at Step Two. A number of scholars have
argued that Step Two review amounts to, or should amount to, the same
thing as the arbitrary and capricious review that courts apply to
exercises of agency discretion,217 and the Supreme Court has suggested
that it agrees.218 From a minimalist perspective, I would agree that these
standards should be the same, and more specifically, that they should be
the standard described above: a baseline reasonableness review, with
elevated scrutiny when it appears the agency’s inadequate attention to
relevant basic interests caused serious harms. This has the nice feature
of harmonizing well with the language of Chevron, which instructs
courts to allow reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutes.
From a minimalist perspective, Chevron is a sensible doctrine. Step One
is a threshold inquiry establishing that the agency in fact has some
discretion within the statute at issue, and then Step Two assures that
the agency uses its discretion in a reasonable way. As a whole, Chevron
leaves agencies ample room to choose a course of action while working
as a check against domination.
In recent years, however, the fate of Chevron has become unclear. A
number of decisions have established carve-outs from Chevron review,
prescribing higher scrutiny instead,219 although some cases have pushed
in the other direction.220 To take a very high-profile recent example, in
King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts rejected out of hand the
suggestion that Chevron deference was owed to the Treasury
Department’s interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable
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Care Act.221 On occasion, the Court has nominally applied Chevron, but
in anything but a spirit of deference.222 Moreover, empirical work
indicates that the Supreme Court routinely declines to apply Chevron
without comment in circumstances that, according to the Court’s own
doctrine, Chevron should apply.223 In lieu of Chevron, courts typically
review agencies’ interpretations of statutes within less deferential
frameworks, such as the sliding-scale Skidmore deference.
From the perspective of democratic minimalism, these incursions into
Chevron’s domain224 are suspect. Chevron provides enough scrutiny to
block agency actions that amount to domination, but not so much as to
derail or ossify legitimate agency decision-making processes. There may
be reasons to provide less deference in some circumstances, but courts
should articulate clearly why and when additional scrutiny is warranted.
E. Rethinking Reviewability
This last point relates not to how judicial review should be conducted,
but when.
A raft of administrative law doctrines erect potential barriers to
obtaining judicial review. These include ripeness, mootness, standing,
finality, and (in some cases) exhaustion and primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, contemporary administrative law gives radically divergent
treatment to agency action and agency failures to act—notwithstanding
the fact that the APA defines agency action to include the failure to
act.225 To a democratic minimalist, these doctrines deserve some
scrutiny, to ensure they are not applied in ways that unfairly harm parties
in their basic interests.
Reviewability doctrines serve the important purpose of keeping out of
the courts matters that should be handled by agencies in the first
instance.226 And in some instances, courts have pursued this purpose in
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a manner appropriately sensitive to potential litigants’ interest in access
to courts. Ripeness doctrine is a good example. In Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a regulation was ripe for judicial review. The
question of ripeness, the Court held, “require[es] us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration.”227 The doctrine works out to
require pre-enforcement review when delaying judicial review would
impose a substantial harm on the plaintiff.
The facts of Abbott Laboratories illustrate how denying pre-enforcement
review can amount to domination of the regulated party. Abbott, a
pharmaceutical company, argued that an FDA regulation governing the
labeling of prescription drugs was invalid. In the absence of preenforcement review, if Abbott wished to challenge the validity of the
regulation, it would need to defy it, and wait for an enforcement action
from the FDA. As a defense, Abbott could collaterally challenge the
validity of the regulation. But even if Abbott took this course and
ultimately prevailed at trial, for a drug maker to openly defy FDA
regulations would have ruinous consequences for its reputation.228 In
effect, then, Abbott had one realistic option: to comply with a regulation
that was (by hypothesis) invalid. So as a practical matter, a denial of preenforcement review would complete vitiate Abbott’s right to lawful
agency action. Appropriately, the Supreme Court held that Abbott’s
challenge was ripe, and pre-enforcement review remains the standard
practice.
Other limits on reviewability have developed in ways that work
substantial unfairness on would-be litigants, however. The way courts
handle challenges to agency inaction is the chief offender. As noted
above, the APA provides for review of agency action, and declares that
agency action includes “failure to act.”229 But in his opinion for the
Court in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,230 Justice Scalia
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defined very narrowly the kinds of agency inaction that are subject to
review. A textual analysis of the definition of agency action led Justice
Scalia to the conclusion that “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only
where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency
action that is it required to take.”231 Precisely because agencies are granted
significant discretion even with respect to tasks they must undertake,
requiring litigants to point to a specific thing that agencies have to do
comes close to rendering the right to review failures to act a dead letter.
To a minimalist, this is a problem because agency inaction can pose
threats to persons’ basic interests just as much as agency actions can. A
case from the Third Circuit illustrates the point. Hexavalent chromium,
a chemical compound with certain industrial applications, is a human
carcinogen, and a potent one. According to a study conducted by
OSHA, workers exposed to 100 micrograms per cubic meter of
hexavalent chromium on a daily basis over a working lifetime could
anticipate excess cancer deaths in the eye-popping range of 88 to 342 per
1000.232 And yet, OSHA set the permissible exposure limit (PEL) to 100
micrograms per cubic meter, and failed to lower the limit for over thirty
years, even once it became clear that the existing standard was grossly
inadequate to protect human health, and in the face of a lawsuit seeking
to force the agency to act.233
Here is a situation where workers’ most basic interest—in life—is
threatened by the agency’s failure to take action in accordance with its
mandate to protect workers against toxic materials.234 Minimalism
highlights how an unnecessarily crabbed reading of the APA’s definition
of “agency action” makes our system of government less democratic, if
it arbitrarily subjects persons to substantial harms without possibility of
remedy. A different reading of the statute could establish at least a rough
symmetry between the kind of justification an agency has to provide
231
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whether its action or inaction results in serious harm. When parties can
show that they are harmed in their basic interests by agencies’ failures
to take actions properly within their power, courts could require
agencies to explain why, notwithstanding their careful attention to the
affected interests, other considerations persuasively counseled against
taking the action requested.
Other reviewability doctrines also elevate formalism over the protection
of those vulnerable to exercises of administrative power. Finality
doctrine, for instance, means that an important class of agency decisions
evade judicial review entirely, even though they may have substantial
impacts. Dalton v. Specter235 and Bennett v. Spear236 establish that when the
formal responsibility for ratifying an agency’s decision rests with the
President, review is not available: the agency’s work cannot be reviewed
because it is not final without action by the President, and the
President’s action cannot be reviewed because the President is not an
agency. Recent circuit court decisions have held that guidance
documents advising parties on agency statutory interpretations237 and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determinations that private property is
wetland, and hence protected under the Clean Water Act,238 are not
final, and therefore not reviewable. As a practical matter, such rulings
irrevocably foreclose development on the affected lands. Decisions such
as these effectively strip parties of their legal protection against
arbitrary agency actions that potentially have serious consequences, and
therefore are suspect.
In the case of OSHA and hexavalent chromium, the Third Circuit
ultimately did order the agency to promulgate a new standard.239 In part,
the agency had hoist itself on its own petard, by repeatedly
acknowledging the need to take action and promising to do so, before
lapsing again and again into lassitude. And the Third Circuit’s ruling
only came after more than thirty years of delay on the agency’s part.
From the standpoint of democratic minimalism, it should not be so
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difficult to have courts force agencies to do their job when lives are at
stake.240
V. CONCLUSION
The previous Part laid out a model of judicial review in administrative
law aimed at reducing domination. The basic prescription is for a
baseline of reasonableness review, with elevated scrutiny under
circumstances where agency failures appear to have caused parties
significant harm to their basic interests. I played out the implications of
this way of looking at judicial review for Chevron review, for the kinds of
reasons agencies should have to give, and for the availability of review.
Some might object that these prescriptions for judicial review ask courts
to do work for which they are not cut out. Specifically, tying the
intensity of review to the impact agency action has on parties requires
judgments from courts that are both fact-intensive and value-based.
What impacts an agency action has on people is an empirical question,
and not always an easy one to answer. And judgments about what kinds
of harms count as serious necessarily involve contestable assumptions
about what interests are really important.
Relatedly, one might conclude that this framework for review is
especially ill-suited to complex, technical regulatory environments—
which are so many of the environments in which agencies are active.
The human dimension can be hard to see when it comes to, for instance,
the regulation of power grids. What guidance, if any, can minimally
democratic administrative law provide to courts working in this or
similar areas?
These objections have some force: this minimally democratic
conception would change aspects of judicial review, and not necessarily
in ways that play to courts’ strengths. I do not dismiss them, and to the
extent they are convincing, they are reasons against reworking judicial
review along the lines described above. But I do argue that these
objections are not as compelling as they might appear at first glance.
First, while the minimalist framework would require courts to make
assessments of the potential harm that agency actions pose, it is
240

For this reason, the elimination of exhaustion as a freestanding
reviewability requirement is a salutary development from the perspective of
democratic minimalism. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).

MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

59

important to be clear about when and why this might be difficult for
judges. Assessing harms in general is by no means outside of judges’ skill
set. Courts must judge harm to parties, for instance, in determining
whether to grant a preliminary injunction.241 Judges sometimes
determine both compensatory and punitive damages.242 The Mathews v.
Eldridge due process framework requires courts to assess the adverse
impact that agency procedures have on claimants who appear before the
agency.243 While the analysis prescribed above for determining whether
heightened scrutiny is warranted is not identical to any of these, it is not
necessarily any more difficult or more unpredictable, at least much of
the time.244
Complex and technical regulatory environments pose difficulties for
judicial review in general: courts reviewing agency choices in areas
requiring subject-specific expertise can quickly find themselves out of
their depth. What is most distinctive about the minimalist framework
is that it requires courts to assess whether the agency action threatens
serious harm to persons. Complex and technical areas are likely to pose
greater challenges for the minimalist framework of review review,
relative to other forms of judicial review, only insofar as this inquiry into
the potential for harm is a difficult one in these areas. But frequently,
these assessments will not require technical knowledge, even in
technical areas. For instance: the regulation of nuclear power plant
safety is an immensely technical field. But the potential impact of a
regulatory failure on people’s basic interests is readily apparent. If a
party makes a credible claim that a decision by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to waive fire safety requirements for certain reactors gave
insufficient consideration to the interests of persons living near them,
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then a reviewing court should demand a clear showing from the agency
to the contrary.245
*
The need to reconcile the fact of administrative power with our
democratic commitments animates so much of administrative law, but
just what does a commitment to democratic governance entail? A
minimalist might argue that the core idea of democracy is not
representation, or deliberation, or even electoral accountability, but the
principle of non-domination. This Article has reevaluated a cornerstone
of administrative law, the review of agency action by courts, from the
standpoint of democratic minimalism. I have argued from minimalist
premises in favor of a variable intensity of review framework that
combines a default norm of reasonableness review with the possibility
for more intensive scrutiny when the risk of domination is higher. I have
also weighed in, from this perspective, on debates over the scope of
Chevron review, the admissibility of political reasons to justify agency
action, and the availability of judicial review.
This project is, in important respects a modular one: the argument has
different stages, and one could accept some while rejecting others. One
could agree that the conceptions of democracy reflected in
contemporary administrative thinking are problematic and disagree
that a minimalist approach is preferable. Or one could endorse a
minimalist conception of democracy but reject one oriented around the
concept of non-domination. One could even accept this particular
minimalist conception of democracy and disagree about what it implies
for judicial review. Indeed, the framework for judicial review outlined
above is intended to be more illustrative than definitive. The ultimate
ambition of this Article is not to offer a comprehensive prescription for
administrative reform so much as it is to stimulate further attention to
the important question of what our democratic commitments mean for
our administrative practices.
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